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An imminent US Supreme Court ruling should resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing
pharmaceutical companies today.

O

n March 25, 2013, the US Supreme
Court heard arguments in Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis, Inc. The Court’s decision, which will likely come out in June, should
resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing
pharmaceutical companies today: whether
brand pharmaceutical manufacturers can settle patent lawsuits with generic drug makers
by paying them to delay entering the market
after the generics’ approval but before any of
the brands’ relevant patents expire. Typically,
payments to delay competitors’ entry in a
marketplace violate antitrust laws as being
anticompetitive. But the matter is complicated
when patents are involved. Because patents
are simply the right to prevent someone else
from practicing the patented invention, paying
someone to delay doing so could also be seen
as pro-competitive if it grants a right to enter
the marketplace earlier than the patent would
normally allow. Nonetheless, there is a concern
that these reverse payments or pay-to-delay settlements are little more than two competitors
divvying up a very lucrative market. And the
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the complicated regulatory framework concerning the
US Food and Drug Administration’s approval of
generic drugs blocked by patents, is to “encourage patent challenges as a way of increasing consumer access to low-cost drugs”1.
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act says little
about whether reverse-payment settlements
violate the antitrust laws, the lower courts of
appeal have adopted a variety of—and sometimes conflicting—approaches to analyzing these settlements in an antitrust context.
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Whether the Supreme Court’s ruling will have
a significant impact on the pharmaceutical
industry will likely depend on how the Court
resolves these conflicts.
Under one theory, the Supreme Court may
conclude that reverse-payment settlements
are always or per se permissible as long as the
generic drug enters the market before any relevant patents expire. Adopting this ‘scope of
the patent’ test will likely be a major boon to
brand pharmaceutical companies. Historically,
reverse-payment settlements by brand pharmaceutical manufacturers have allowed generics
to enter the market, on average, 90.2 months
before the protecting patents expire, at an average sales revenue loss to the brand of $1.31 billion (ref. 2). A scope-of-the-patent approach,
however, would allow brand pharmaceutical
manufacturers to structure settlements that
essentially delayed generic entry until days or
weeks before any relevant patents expire. This
would ensure brand pharmaceutical companies
supracompetitive profits for longer—and more
predictable—periods of time.
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court
may conclude that reverse-payment settlements are per se impermissible, regardless of
the duration or scope of the delay relative to
the patents. But because the Hatch-Waxman
Act generally requires brand pharmaceutical
companies to sue their generic competitors or
forgo market exclusivity, brand pharmas would
often be placed in the peculiar situation of litigating patent lawsuits against generics even if
such cases are in neither parties’ best interests.
Where a brand’s patents are weak, forced litigation will more likely result in the patents’
invalidation, and a resulting flood of generic
competitors. This would be good for consumers but bad for both brand and generic companies. Each additional generic entrant tends to
substantially decrease the profits of both brand

and generic companies3. Where a brand pharma’s patents are strong, however, forced litigation will likely keep generic competitors off
the market until the patents’ expiration. This
would be good—although costly—for brand
pharmas, and obviously bad for consumers. In
addition, smaller or start-up brand pharmas—
who are particularly sensitive to the validity of
their patents—would be forced to shoulder the
costly burden of litigation.
The Supreme Court may, however, take
a more nuanced view than either of these
two extremes. Rather than determining that
reverse-payment settlements are per se permissible or impermissible, the Court may conclude
that such settlements are only presumptively
impermissible. Brand and generic pharmas
that wish to settle patent litigation may overcome this presumption by proving to the
trial court that a proposed settlement is procompetitive because it also includes unrelated
business services, structures itself around
expected litigation costs or involves other
unusual circumstances. This nuanced view of
reverse-payment settlements has broad appeal
in the legal community. It is currently supported by the Federal Trade Commission, the
American Antitrust Institute, and in a friendof-the-court brief filed by 118 academics in law,
economics and business4,5.
The effect of this nuanced rule on the
pharma industry, however, would be unclear.
With the diminishment of reverse payments
as an option, only large generic manufacturers will be able to afford expensive patent
lawsuits against brand pharmas, which average $5 million through trial6. In the event
that a business services settlement could be
reached, this would similarly benefit larger
generic manufacturers that have more assets
and access to services than smaller manufacturers. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this
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one of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s sponsors,
filed a friend-of-the-court brief in Actavis calling for a ban on reverse-payment settlements7.
Actavis’s legacy may be a political rather than
a judicial one.
Ultimately, the effect of the Actavis ruling
on the pharmaceutical industry will depend
on the rules the Supreme Court adopts in analyzing reverse-payment settlements. Those
rules may disproportionately affect larger
pharmaceutical companies—both brands and
generics—at the expense of smaller ones. But
even then, Congress may very well have something to say about it.
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size-specific effect would ultimately be more
beneficial to consumers or brand pharmas than
the current state of affairs.
Irrespective of the rule adopted by the
Supreme Court, it is also possible that Congress
could step in and create a rule of its own.
Congress has recently taken an extraordinary
interest in innovation policy despite the current political deadlock. It passed the America
Invents Act in 2011, the first major substantive
change to the patent statute in over 30 years.
New bills focusing on some of the current ills of
patent law are now frequently introduced. And
California congressman Henry A. Waxman,
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